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Abstract
The issue of incentives has been studied for the adoption of soil and water conservation in the ravines of
Gujarat in the context of holistic development of small and marginal farms and their profitability. It is
hypothesized that poor economic condition of farmers impedes their ability to make large-scale investment
in conservation agriculture, in general and improvement of land, in particular. The study is based on two
groups of farms- with and without conservation history. The results have substantiated the argument that
under the present price scenario, farm profitability makes the marginal farms susceptible to a vicious
poverty circle. The input and output prices prevailing in the region do not favour the farming enterprise.
Thus, this policy variable would have little impact on farm profitability and the incentive to adopt conservation
on farm. Hence, such farms need an initial dose of state help. This fact has been clearly brought out in the
study area. The farms benefiting from past conservation programme of the state government have done
better than those who were deprived of it. The former group of farms has been able to lease-in better piece
of land and take cash crop to raise their profit level. This has positively affected their investment decisions.
While land tenure has shown weak relation with decision of farm investment, farmers’ credit worthiness
might play a greater role in helping adoption of conservation on farm. Thus, financial inclusion of these
marginal farms could be an important incentive policy variable for adoption of conservation measures in
this region.
Key words: Soil and water conservation, conservation agriculture, credit worthiness, land tenure, farm
investment, Gujarat ravines
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Introduction
The problems of land degradation and soil erosion
have drawn the attention of the policy makers since
long. The annual average loss of nutrients from land
due to soil erosion has been estimated as 5.37 - 8.4
million tonnes (Mt) (Fertiliser Statistics, 2007-08) and
the loss of production due to non-development of ravines
has been estimated to be 3 Mt/ annum. If not checked,
the ravines would encroach into the productive table
lands at an average rate of 8000 ha/annum. Beginning
with the Second Five-Year Plan, soil conservation
programmes, legislations and regulations are being
adopted to prevent land degradation and several
conservation practices are being promoted. While the
focus is on the adoption of soil and water conservation
on farm, the issue of farm development and socio-
economics of farming as a whole is being ignored. This
fact about natural resource management in general and
adoption of holistic approach to farm development1 in
particular has been well documented recently by
Bamire et al. (2005) and earlier by Shaxson et al.
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The socio-economic, policy and unsustainable
management practices have been identified as the major
causes of degradation of agricultural land resources2
(Meadows and Hoffman, 2002). At the micro level,
another important cause of natural resource degradation
is the poor efficiency in the use of resources for
economic production purposes, mainly due to lack of
economic power to invest in conservation technologies,
and this is a characteristic feature of the developing
countries like India. Poor economic condition of these
countries further impedes their ability to make large-
scale investments on the conservation of these
resources. Further, the economic cost of the loss in
crop productivity from land degradation is higher in
regions with much marginal land and low levels of crop
productivity compared to the regions with favourable
production conditions (Arifin, 1995; 1997). In this
context, the degradation caused due to extension of
ravines needs special attention, as these marginal lands
are susceptible to climatic aberrations like floods. These
lands warrant a comprehensive and long-term solution
of the problem not only for resource sustainability but
for environmental remediation also.
It is a fact that conservation agriculture practice is
the remedy for the ills of these regions and the benefits
of conservation agriculture can be observed at farm,
regional and national levels (Appendix I). But, studies
assessing the economic incentives of conservation
agriculture that focussed on marginal lands of ravines
are few. The economic incentives, categorized as
external and internal, could be both direct and indirect.
The external incentives are in the form of direct state
investments in soil and water conservation (SWC)
measures on farmers’ fields, input subsidies, supply of
economically important saplings, farm implements and
tools, drought relief programmes, wages, employment
programmes, etc. Indirect external incentives are
largely in the form of farm extension services, credit,
market availability and accessibility for farm produce
disposal, etc (Chinnappa Reddy et al., 2004).
Despite a gradual rise in the average and per-
capita income levels, the household incomes are still
not high enough to invest substantially on natural
resource conservation3. Under such a scenario, the
vicious circle of land degradation, low productivity, poor
returns and profitability leading to poor investment on
land, further leads to perpetual environmental
degradation. This circle needs to be broken with relevant
incentive mechanism in the specific contexts. While
the indirect incentives like output price, access to
market, credit facility and poor extension services
affect the farm production systems, the direct incentives
provide support to the marginal farms by imparting initial
impetus. The present study has examined these issues
on the marginal farms in the Mahisagar river of Gujarat.
About 31 per cent of the land under different types of
degradation lies in the western India and 24 per cent of
these degraded lands fall in the state of Gujarat alone.
About 0.40 Mha land, along the course of all major
river systems, is affected by the ravines in Gujarat, as
per the estimates of National Commission on
Agriculture (Sharma et al., 1981). These lands are in
degraded conditions. Despite several land improvement
programmes, the productivity of food grains is less in
this region than the national average, except for the
Goa state. This calls for further intensification of soil
and water conservation programmes, apart from other
development schemes in the region. While there has
been a good impact of conservation programmes with
substantial budgetary allocations made over the
successive plan periods, adoption of conservation
practices is still lacking and the problem of soil erosion
and thereby, the loss of productivity continues to draw
the attention of planners and policy makers.
This study has been undertaken with the objective
of examining the economics of conservation (a direct
incentive to invest on land) of the marginal farms
specific to the Mahi ravine lands and other direct and
indirect incentive mechanisms of general nature
pertaining to the region.
The literature on land degradation and incentives
for adoption of conservation agriculture is abound with
multitude of factors such as input and output prices
and their relationship with land degradation (Barbier,
1988; Barbier and Burgess, 1992; Coxhead, 1995;
Coxhead and Shively, 1995), policies on subsidizing the
initial investment costs and incentives to conserve the
soil (Shiferaw et al., 2001), government intervention in
agricultural markets and farm level incentives (Barrett,
1989; Repetto, 1988). However, the complexity of issues
makes it context-specific and hence, the incentive
mechanism needs to be suggested specific to the
concerned bio-physical and socio-economic conditions
of the stakeholders. This paper attempts to look into
these aspects and suggests policy implications.Pande et al. : Incentive for Soil & Water Conservation on Farm in Ravines of Gujarat 111
Data and Methodology
Study Area, Sample Size and Data Collection
Of the total ravine-affected land in Gujarat, the
largest gullied area of 61,888 ha is along the river
Mahisagar (Sharma et al., 1981) and, therefore, these
ravines were selected for the study. Two districts—
Vadodara and Anand— were selected along the left
and right banks of the river, where most of the ravine
lands are spread. Five villages, two in the Anand district
and three in the Vadodara district, were selected based
on the ravine area in the districts. A list of farms,
comprising marginal, small and medium farm-
categories, with lands adjacent to ravines was finalized
and data on land-use and crops were collected. The
sample included farms with as well as without
conservation history. A farm with conservation history
had, in the past, benefited under the state conservation
programme. However, the farms, for which complete
and consistent information was not available, were
dropped from the sample. Thus, a sample of 120 farms,
52 farms with conservation measures and 68 farms
without conservation measures was retained for the
analysis.
A well-structured questionnaire was used to collect
information from the fields. Surveys were conducted
to elicit primary information on soil conservation history,
crop and cropping system, perception of farmers about
water and soil losses from their fields, its intensity and
measures of soil and water conservation. The secondary
data on area, production and farm harvest price were
also collected for the districts and the state.
Methodology
The data collected on different economic variables
were analyzed by computing statistical averages and
economics was worked out following the standard
discount cash flow technique, viz. present value of net
benefit under the two scenarios, with and without
conservation. Thus, the internal incentive on farm was
studied in terms of short-term profitability by examining
annual costs and returns and long-term farm profitability
in terms of present value of net benefits. These
indicators, apart from management input, are also
governed by prices realized on farm. The external
incentive specific to the region was examined by relating
decision to investment on land with external factors
like land tenure, farmers’ credit worthiness, cash crop
grown and other factors such as total holding size, share
of crop land versus ravine land, etc.
Binary probit regression model was used to relate
farm investment decision with external factors affecting
farm production system in the study area (Sebopetji
and Belete, 2009).
A linear model of the form of Equation (1) was specified
in the study:
Yi = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3x3 + β4x4 + β5x5 + β6x6 +
β7x7 + v …(1)
where,
Yi = Farmers’ decision to invest on land, which
takes the value of 1 if the farmer decides to
invest, 0 otherwise,
x1 = Land under crop production (ha),
x2 = Share of crop land (%),
x3 = Total landholding size (ha),
x4 = Whether ravine land exists adjacent to crop
land (dummy variable),
x5 = Land tenure (ownership of land) (dummy
variable),
x6 = Credit worthiness (dummy variable),
x7 = Cash crop (dummy variable), and
v = Random disturbance-term.
It was hypothesized that farmers’ total landholding
size, land under crop production and share of crop land
as against ravine land in the total landholding would
positively influence his decision to invest on land, as
these directly impact his farm profitability and also act
as collaterals (Besley, 1995) for taking loan locally and
also from banking and non-banking financial institutions.
Land tenure has a direct and positive relation with
decision on farm investment. Farmers’ credit worthiness
was taken as the ability to take loan for farm investment
and was measured as a binary (dummy) variable.
Farmers giving negative response feared that they
would not be able to return the loan under the given
productivity levels of crop land and were considered
as having poor credit worthiness. Cash crop would also
have positive relationship with investment decision.
Farmers who were benefited from a previous
conservation programme of the state, were able to
lease-in good parcel of land and grow cash crop. This
helped them reap farm profit and thereby affecting their
decision to invest on land.112 Agricultural Economics Research Review    Vol.24   January-June 2011
Results and Discussion
Profile of Farms, Land-use and Cropping System
Among the sample farms, the land mostly belonged
to marginal, small and medium farm categories (Table
1), with average holding size of 1.3 ha. About 22.4 per
cent landholdings were being cultivated by tenants and
the majority of them were medium farmers. The
average holding size was slightly bigger on farms with
conservation history and so was the ravine land
adjacent to these marginal table lands. As the holding-
size increased, the proportion of ravine land also
increased in different classes of holdings. The land-
use pattern of the two groups of farms revealed that
the distribution of arable and non-arable land was not
markedly different within different landholding classes.
This could make the comparison of the two groups of
farms feasible and justifiable within different landholding
classes.
Among the farms with conservation history, 58 per
cent of the marginal farmers owned an average
landholding of 0.6 ha, small and medium farms having
average holding size of 1.5 ha and 2.9 ha, respectively.
While marginal and small holdings had a small share of
ravine land, medium and large farms had 50 per cent
or more land under ravines. Among the farms without
conservation history, on the other hand, 66 per cent of
the marginal farmers owned an average landholding of
0.5 ha, while small and medium farmers had an average
holding size of 1.3 ha and 2.8 ha, respectively. Across
different landholding classes, the share of ravine land
in farm holding increased from 13 per cent in marginal
holdings to 91 per cent in large holdings. Bajra (Pearl
millet) and bajra-based cropping system was most
prevalent across all the categories of farms. Farms
with irrigation facility also cultivated irrigated crops like
wheat, tobacco and summer bajra. The number of such
farms was more under farms with conservation history
as compared to the farms without conservation history.
It was observed that some of the farms, particularly
medium in the former category, had leased-in some
better parcels of levelled land and took cash crops like
tobacco and wheat.
Problem of Soil/Water Loss
In the study on run-off and soil loss, most of the
farmers in the two groups reported the incidence of
run-off and consequent soil loss during rains. The
farmers without conservation history reported a higher
incidence (67-93% farmers) than those with
conservation history (63-87% farmers); though the
difference was non-significant (Table 2). The farms in
the former group reported a higher effect of run-off on
loss of top soil and the overall effect on yield loss (Table
3) though effect on loss of fertilizer and seed from
fields was reported to be of a similar trend. It was
inferred that the loss of top soil on farms with
conservation history was of relatively small magnitude
having a little effect on yield loss in contrast to the
farms with no conservation measures.
Table 1. Landholding size across different farm sizes
Farm category Farms with conservation history  Farms without conservation history
No. Av. holding size (ha) No. Av. holding size (ha)
Marginal 30 (57.7) 0.56 45 (66.2) 0.48
Small 8 (15.4) 1.48 16 (23.5) 1.34
Medium 14 (26.9) 2.92 7 (10.3) 2.80
Note: Figures within the parentheses are percentage of total sample farms.
Table 2. Farmers’ perception about runoff and soil loss
 Farm category  Per cent farmers reporting
Farms with conservation history Farms without conservation history
Soil loss Run-off Soil loss Run-off
Marginal 87 87 93 56
Small 63 88 88 94
Medium 75 83 67 67Pande et al. : Incentive for Soil & Water Conservation on Farm in Ravines of Gujarat 113
Conservation Measures and Farm Investment
Though farms in general perceived occurrence of
run-off and its effect on crop production, the individual
efforts to adopt conservation measures were not
observed. In fact, the majority of farms (more than
60%) in the three categories (marginal, small and
medium) got it done initially through the state agency
and a few of them later made some investment on
maintenance (Table 4). The average investment on
maintenance varied from ` 20/m to ` 70/m of earthen
bund (at 2002-03 prices). Further, the farms with
conservation history invested on the maintenance of
conservation measures, though a small amount, on
earthen bunds (earthen field bund and levelling were
reported to be the only conservation measures).
Private Net Benefit Realized on Farm
An attempt was made to analyze the economics
of the existing land-use system. Since ravine lands had
not been put to any productive use, economics was
examined for the marginal lands put to crop production.
Costs and returns were examined based on paid out
cost of hired and purchased inputs and also considering
the cost of family resources valued at opportunity cost.
The costs and returns distribution revealed that farms
with conservation history were better off than those
without conservation history. This not only explained
the differential pattern of small investment on farm
among different land classes but also indicated that the
latter group with small returns had little incentive to
invest on land. Benefit cost analysis of crop production
was done with 10 per cent discount rate and 30 years
period of analysis, considering paid out cost for
purchased inputs and including cost of family resources,
separately, with the aim of assessing the long-term
profitability, an indicator of incentive for on-farm
investment.
The cash flow analysis revealed positive benefits
realized by farms. Both categories of farms, with and
without conservation measures, realized positive
benefits under cash flow analysis (Table 5) implying,
thereby, that they would continue the existing production
system. However, this speaks little about the incentive
to invest on land. The investment on farm, which is a
function of long-term profitability, would occur only if
net benefits were positive in the long-run. This was
examined with private opportunity cost analysis, which
also considered costs of family resources like family
labour, rent on land, interest paid on family asset, etc.
While farms with conservation history realized positive
net benefits under the private opportunity analysis also,
those farms with no conservation measures realized
no benefits. In other words, the latter group of farms
would hardly have any incentive to invest on land in
future. Further, the net benefit realized by even farms
with conservation history, particularly marginal farms,
was too small to induce them to invest on land. The
Table 3. Incidence of run-off and soil loss on marginal farms in Mahi ravines
Loss Farms with conservation Farms without conservation
Marginal  Small Medium Marginal Small Medium
Top soil getting washed 70 63 75 91 94 44
Fertilizer getting washed 17 13 42 27 13 22
Seed getting washed 23 13 33 33 10 32
Yield loss 33 25 25 47 29 33
Table 4. Adoption of conservation measures and average investment on farm
Farm category Per cent farmers reporting Maintenance Average investment on
conservation measures done maintenance of earthen
Taken by self Through state agency bund (`/m)*
Marginal 40 60 20 20/-
Small 25 75 38 60/-
Medium 33 67 25 70/-
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Table 5. Present value of net benefit realized from crop production on marginal farms*
 (Discount rate = 0.10, Period of analysis = 30 years) (`/ha/annum)
Farm category Cash flow analysis Private opportunity cost analysis
With conservation Without conservation With conservation Without conservation
Marginal 489 15 68 -307
Small 1049 318 517 -226
Medium 5415 335 842 -457
*At 2002-03 prices
Table 6. Sensitivity of benefits to discount rates
Farm category Net present benefit (`/ha/annum)
Farms with conservation history Farms without conservation history
0.06 0.08 0.10 0.15 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.15
Marginal 1541 896 489 123 71 40 15 6
Small 3306 1852 1048 264 1002 562 318 80
Medium 5558 3114 5415 444 1055 592 335 84
marginal, small and medium farms realized a net annual
benefit ranging from ` 68/ha and ` 842/ha. This explains
the small investments made on bund maintenance by
the farms even with conservation measure.
Further, the sensitivity analysis showed that the
long-term benefits were quite sensitive to discount rate.
The marginal and small farms reflected more sensitivity
as compared to medium farms. As discount rate
increased, the benefits declined, implying, thereby that
at higher rates farmers would tend to have short
production vision and thus, the tendency to avoid
investment on land improvement. The sensitivity of small
farm holdings indicated that they would have little
incentive to invest in an environment of higher discount
rates (Table 6).
The analysis showed that despite perception about
runoff and soil loss, farmers were not able to make
investment on the maintenance of conservation due to
poor farm returns. This strengthens the argument that
holistic development of farm and addressing the issue
of farm profitability could pave the way for required
levels of investment on conservation structures.
Input-output Price, Farm Profitability and Price
Incentive
The ratio of farm harvest price for pearl millet in
the Vadodara district and the consumer price index for
agricultural labour was worked out to compute the real
domestic price realized by pearl millet growers in the
region. The ratio, which reflected the average
purchasing power of a rupee earned from this major
crop, was not found favourable to farmers. In such a
scenario, price incentive in bajra did not induce farm
profitability, as revealed in the private opportunity cost
analysis and, hence, had little incentives for farmers to
invest on land.
Factors Affecting Investment Behaviour of Small
and Marginal Farms
The analysis conducted to examine the investment
behaviour of small and marginal farms and to identify
the factors that affect farmers’ decision about
investment on land revealed crop area, landholding size,
cash crop and credit worthiness to be positive and ravine
land, share of crop land and tenure to be negative, though
insignificant (Table 7). Cash crop and credit worthiness
of a farmer turned out to be significant at 1 per cent
and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively.
Income received from cash crop affected
investment decision. Only those small and marginal
farms which had received state help in the past, were
able to lease-in parcel of table land and grew cash
crop on such levelled land. Income from cash crop
enabled them to invest on land levelling and bunding on
other land parcels near ravines. The size of the
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parameter fit for policy implications. The marginal farms
in the Mahi ravines, being vulnerable to low productivity
and profitability, are unable to make investment on land.
Initial state help in terms of conservation programme
is essential to break the vicious circle of poor
productivity, low farm returns and absence of
investment on land. This has been supported by Leach
and Mearns (1996) who argued that stewardship over
natural resources is the responsibility of the state and
for this reason, the state must find solution to the problem
of land degradation.
Credit worthiness of farmers was another factor
affecting investment decision. The size of coefficient
(1.08) along with its statistical significance made it an
important tool in terms of policy implications. Policies
may be framed to offer loan for land development on
small/ marginal farms at easier terms and conditions.
Or else, programmes may be designed to make these
groups of farmers inclusive in the financial plan of
banking and non-banking institutions to address the
problem of improving production on farm. This would
help them arrest the process of land degradation in the
long-run.
Land tenure variable was found insignificant. A
number of studies have considered the effects of land
tenure security on the incentives for farmers to make
investments on land improvement, including investments
on soil conservation practices (Feder and Onchan,
1987; Li et al., 1998; Feder and Nishio, 1998), but this
variable turned out to be weak in the study area,
implying, thereby, that tenure security itself had little
impact on marginal farms. The smallholding size in this
region probably holds little scope for land tenure security
and its relationship with investment decision on farm.
In addition, the irregular slopes of these lands, lying
adjacent to the ravines, leave little room for
improvement and thus, enhancing farm profitability.
Thus, this policy variable is likely have a little role in
adoption of conservation measures.
Conclusions
The study begins with the argument that the problem
of land degradation in general and adoption of
conservation practice in particular cannot be tackled in
isolation and must find a place in the approach of holistic
development of small and marginal farms. It further
substantiates the argument that in the present price
scenario, returns on farm make the marginal farms
susceptible to a vicious poverty circle. The input and
output prices prevailing in the region do not favour the
farming enterprise. Thus, this policy variable would
have little impact on farm profitability and thereby, the
incentive to adopt conservation on farm. Hence, such
farms need an initial dose of state help. The facts
gathered during field surveys have clearly brought out
this in the study area. The farms benefiting from past
conservation programme of the state government have
done better than those who were deprived of it. The
farms with conservation history have been able to lease-
in better piece of land and take cash crop to raise their
profit level. This has positively affected their investment
decisions4. Land tenure has not turned out be a
Table 7. Factors affecting investment decision on small and marginal farms in Mahi ravines (Probit regression)
Parameter Regression Standard Significance
coefficients (β) error
Land under crop production (ha) 0.085 0.13 0.641
Share of crop land (%) -0.001 0.01 0.891
Total holding size (ha) 0.031 0.08 0.696
Ravine land adjacent to field (dummy variable) -0.064 0.66 0.923
Land tenure (dummy variable) -0.369 0.520 0.478
Credit worthiness (dummy variable) 1.081** 0.693 0.108
Cash crop sown (dummy variable) 2.006* 0.602 0.0009
N = 120
log likelihood 159.76
Goodness of fit 117.41
Cases predicted correctly (%) 72.5
Note: * and **denote significance at 1 per cent and 10 per cent levels, respectively116 Agricultural Economics Research Review    Vol.24   January-June 2011
significant variable affecting decision to invest on farm.
This has been explained in terms of the size and bio-
physical nature of such marginal holdings in the ravine
region. Credit worthiness, however, has shown a
positive and significant relation with on-farm
conservation decision. Financial help from banking
institutions could improve their credit worthiness, thus,
helping them invest on their land. The scope of present
policy of financial inclusion could, thus, be broadened
to resolve the issue of poor farm productivity and
address the problem of land degradation in this region.
Notes
1 There is a growing awareness about the need to
move away from a narrow focus on soil
conservation per se and support farmers’
responses to a changing resource base, as argued
by Shaxson et al. (1997).
2 Two issues are worth mentioning (Hofffman et
al., 1999), viz. pattern of population growth and
pattern of land tenure, though the relationship
between demography and land tenure is complex
internationally. Land tenure, however, has emerged
as the most important factor.
3 In addition to this there exists an inter-temporal
trade off in the decision-making of farmers with
respect to conservation investment, as argued by
Shiferaw and Holden (2001). The investments
often have long pay back periods and reduce short-
term household incomes. The critical question is
whether long-term benefits would be sufficient to
compensate farmers’ immediate costs.
4 Regression of farm investment level over variables
such as short- and long-term profits in addition to
the variables studied revealed a similar trend.
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Appendix I
Economic incentives and adoption level of selected soil and water conservation (SWC) practices in India
SWC practice Adoption/ Level of Reasons Source
Sustenance1 incentives1
Contour strips in maize High High maize Direct increase Agnihotri et al. (1998)
coupled with green manuring yields in yields
Graded bunds to dispose Medium Performed well Anon. (2003)
excess water
Terracing Medium High Checks soil erosion Shah and Patil (1970)
and provides higher
yield
Compartmental bunding Low Low No additional Anon. (1989)
pearl millet yield
Opening of dead furrow High High Easy to adopt with Reddy and Padmalatha (1993)
less investment
Contour cultivation Low Low Difficulty in farm Reddy (1993)
operations
Vegetative barriers Medium Low Insignificant Shah (1998)
yield grain
Water harvesting structures High High Direct access to Lokesh (2004)
irrigation water
1Inferences based on the results of quoted studies
Source: Chinnappa Reddy et al. (2004)